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1. Tabled
In one of the shocking moments in the documentary The Act of Kill-
ing (2012), a former death squad leader, Anwar Congo, rumored to have 
killed close to a thousand people in the 1965–66 Cold War pogrom against 
“communists” in Indonesia, recalls, “It was like we were killing happily.” He 
describes one of his killing methods: the victim would be placed on the 
floor, with a table leg positioned on their neck. Anwar and other male youth 
would then sit on the table, bopping up and down, sometimes singing, 
and as he puts it, “having fun.” Anwar’s admission is shocking because it 
evokes wonder at how one could be playing, singing, and “having fun” while 
committing atrocities. Such shock might rise to disgust for spectators, an 
affect that appears singularly missing in Anwar’s own account. How could 
they knowingly do this?
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Such knowledge is, of course, hardly a straightforward affair: psycho-
analysis teaches us that being aware of something is not the same as 
being conscious of it. In Jacques Lacan’s seminar on ethics, he writes, “We 
would be quite wrong to think that [. . .] men are incapable of transgress-
ing given limits without knowing what they are doing” (Lacan 1992: 199).1 
Lacan’s seminar is an extended meditation on the implications of that reality 
for ethical action. Yet the scene that Anwar Congo describes involves more 
than the fact of knowledge or its distortion—it involves feeling and emo-
tion alongside knowledge (including self- knowledge): “having fun” instead 
of horror and disgust. Killing with impunity seems to entail its own affective 
economy. The Act of Killing documents the feints and contortions of self- 
knowledge on the part of genocidal perpetrators, knowledge that, like the 
emotions that might attend it, remains detectable in the forms of its distor-
tions. Psychoanalysis provides us with an account not only of the place of 
knowledge but also of drives, affects, and desires, each susceptible to a 
degree of transformation in the passage across the conscious and uncon-
scious realms, and each bearing upon the possibility of ethical action. In this 
essay, I will explore the psychology of impunity, including its affects and the 
ethical claims these affects engage. How to understand the abyss that lies 
between what is and what ought to be when the destructive energies that 
underwrite our relations with others are so intimately tied to the good that 
might emerge from those relations? How might our notions of what ought 
to be take stock of the negativity that has not ceased haunting our relations 
with others?2 Such questions require opening up the very domain of ethical 
action by refusing to assume a normative ethical subject in advance. My aim 
is not to enfold extreme cases like mass killings in an aura of ambiguity or in 
any way suggest that the perpetrators are off the hook but to explore what 
else the table—the very figure of philosophical object lessons from Plato to 
Marx—teaches. That is, I aim to consider how such cases become possible.
Regarding the normative subject of ethics, it was too hasty an 
assumption on my part to generalize a spectator of the documentary, who 
would feel the disgust missing on the part of Anwar Congo and his friends. 
What might it mean to bracket, even temporarily, the forms of spectator-
ship solicited by the human rights formation of atrocity, of images of suffer-
ing intended to spark a properly placed emotion (whether disgust, outrage, 
1. Bracketed ellipses here and throughout are mine.
2. Leo Bersani’s work remains the most sustained elaboration of the violence that under-
lies intimate relations. See, especially, Bersani and Phillips 2008; Bersani 2015, 1986.
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sympathy, horror)?3 What might it mean to learn from The Act of Killing by 
holding in abeyance liberal humanist assumptions about the “we” that con-
stitute its audience? Psychoanalysis can be deployed as a form of social 
critique and as an optic; as a reading practice, it allows me simultaneously 
to preserve the sense of horror concerning the mass killings of 1965–66 
and at the same time trace the operations of fantasy that outlive that hor-
ror. While psychoanalysis, like most conceptual frames emerging out of a 
European tradition, has been criticized by some for being inadequate to 
non- European realities,4 it is also the case that psychoanalysis itself has 
been significantly transformed by its non- European practices: from Frantz 
Fanon’s clinic in colonial Algeria to Robert Lemelson’s contemporary work 
on trauma in Indonesia.5 Psychoanalysis is insightful or durable only insofar 
as its categories may be transformed, emphasized differently, or discarded 
along the way. Whether this essay succeeds in deploying psychoanalysis in 
a way that is generative for understanding the postcolonial realities I con-
sider here will be up to the reader to judge. The layered vocabulary that 
psychoanalysis provides for thinking about desire, fantasy, affects, and the 
comportment toward death is what I find insightful when considering the 
complex performances and reenactments in The Act of Killing.
Fantasy, for example, underwrites the operations of disgust, which 
itself, in any case, carries its own form of fascination, secretly bidding the 
disgusting object to seep more of its effluvium. Perhaps this is why revul-
sion feels so immediate, natural, and decisive. Yet revulsion at one’s own 
deeds would have to be socially mediated, like all experiences of disgust 
insofar as disgust regulates the social. Such regulation cannot, of course, 
in itself assure ethical certitude. From Georges Bataille’s valorization of 
disgust (Bataille and Hollier 1988), to Mary Douglas’s classic study Purity 
and Danger (Douglas 1966), to Aurel Kolnai’s phenomenological medita-
tions on disgust (Kolnai 2004), to Julia Kristeva’s reflections on the abject 
(Kristeva 1982), to more recent accounts of the operations of disgust (Miller 
1997; Brinkema 2014; McGinn 2011; Menninghaus 2003), a common thread 
3. The scholarship on violence and its representation is a vast and rich field of its own. 
For particularly insightful work on the intersection of human rights discourse with images 
of atrocity, see Azoulay 2014; Linfield 2012; Rangan 2017; Sliwinski 2011.
4. This critique can often feel predictable, but Gayatri Spivak’s variant of this critique is 
productive because it does more than level an accusation of Eurocentrism (Spivak 1993).
5. Lemelson is a scholar and a filmmaker. See, in particular, his films 40 Years of Silence 
(2009) and Afflictions: Culture and Mental Illness in Indonesia (2010). Also see Lemel-
son et al. 2010.
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emerges in the consideration of disgust: an unsteady oscillation between 
intimacy and distance, repression and acknowledgment, revulsion and 
attraction. Disgust arises from that which cannot be easily metabolized, 
assimilated, or incorporated. In “Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality,” 
Freud notes that “the sexual instinct in its strength enjoys overriding this 
disgust” evoked by genitals of the other (Freud 1953e: 152). Pleasure is not 
outside the ambit of disgust but is instead its secret sharer. Disgust seems 
on the surface to be an unequivocal affect, yet the simplicity of turning 
away from the disgusting object in no way resolves disgust’s fundamental 
ambivalences, ambivalences that unfold in politically divergent forms. For 
example, if police brutality against black people is one form of disgust in 
action, then Black Lives Matter as a movement is a response to that dis-
gust, based as it is on a fundamental disgust with the fact that black lives 
are deemed not to matter. Black Lives Matter’s political charge stems, in 
part, from mirroring the original disgust and calling attention to it.6 Dis-
gust attends the killing of black citizens with impunity, and in the reflecting 
mirror of the social reaction against that impunity disgust reemerges as 
a supreme ethical imperative. In that mirroring, critical changes also take 
place that transmute disgust into outrage, anger, and empathy. Such dis-
placements of affect, whether by means of social formations or by means 
of performance and media are what concern me here in this exploration of 
the psychology of impunity. Although deeply enmeshed in the history of vio-
lence we inherit, disgust itself casts a wider net. Antiwar movements, anti-
torture movements in general, and Joshua Oppenheimer’s films in particu-
lar, rely on the operations of disgust. And yet the execution videos released 
online by Daesh also rely on disgust for their terrorizing effects,7 and in the 
increasingly mediated forms of contemporary drone warfare the foreclo-
sure of disgust marks the inhumanity of digital war that is all too real else-
where—disgust, in its absence too, can enable violence.8
6. Thanks to Gayle Salamon for drawing attention to this as a form of mirroring. The 
mirroring process continues in the reactionary slogans “Blue Lives Matter” or “All Lives 
Matter.”
7. Roxanne Euben (2015) astutely analyzes Daesh execution videos as fantasies of mas-
culine domination.
8. Whether disgust leads to violence or to nonviolence, as an affect it assumes proximity, 
even intimacy. Aurel Kolnai notes that “one particular aspect of proximity constitutes—
though by no means alone—the character of disgust. This is its will to be near, its non- 
self- containedness, or as I would rather put it, its shameless and unrestrained forcing 
itself upon us” (2004: 41).
Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/boundary-2/article-pdf/45/4/65/543368/0450065.pdf
by PRINCETON UNIVERSITY LIBRARY user
on 06 October 2018
Chaudhary / Impunity and Fantasy in The Act of Killing 69
2. Impunity
For Anwar’s part, the conditions that lead up to the scene of kill-
ing, and that extend into the present time of his narration, are conditions of 
impunity that he and his compatriots have enjoyed since the atrocities were 
committed. That impunity was made possible socially by an overlapping 
set of geopolitical and local processes, represented in the documentary by 
means of metaphor and metonymy. In the sequence where Anwar speaks 
of the table used as a weapon, he is dressed in a cowboy outfit and wears a 
large pink hat, and this disclosure is intended as information for the reenact-
ment. So the former killers sit again on the table, dressed in Wild West 
outfits, a filled sack near the table leg signifying a human body, and begin 
singing the well-known Indonesian song “Halo Halo Bandung,” which con-
tains the telling line “city of memories” (kota kenang- kenangan). The song, 
composed during the revolutionary war by Ismail Marzuki, commemorates 
the self- sacrifice of the city’s residents who burned the city instead of allow-
ing it to be reinvaded by colonial forces. The juxtaposition with the previous 
disclosure signals the distance between the hopes of a decolonial politics—
hopes that would crystallize in the Bandung Conference of 1955—and the 
state of Indonesia in 1965, when Cold War games had already put into play 
the processes that would render the hopes of decolonization a distant fan-
tasy, a mere scrim on the surface of upheavals that would prepare the world 
for emerging orders of neoliberal rationality. So much for the 1955 plans 
for cooperation between Asia and Africa, of the scope for cultural and eco-
nomic experimentation that the demise of colonialism seemed to open up.
The Cold War is the mediating and transitional link between the prom-
ises of Bandung and the continued impunity the death squad leaders and 
the Indonesian state enjoy. A June 19, 1966, headline in the New York Times 
reported the atrocities in Indonesia as “A Gleam of Light in Asia” (Reston 
1966), and Time magazine, in a cheery cover story, celebrated the atrocities 
even as the magazine noted that scores of people were decapitated, and 
that “so many bodies were thrown into the Brantas River that Kediri towns-
folk are still afraid to eat fish—and communities downstream had to take 
emergency measures to prevent an outbreak of the plague” (Time 1966, 
23). The magazine presents these details as triumphal, not tragic, conclud-
ing that the killings are “the West’s Best News for Years in Asia” (26). Within 
the scope of the documentary, the United States is intimately proximate to 
Indonesia. While the documentary does not explicitly address the extent of 
US involvement in the mass killings, America makes several appearances 
in the diegesis: the abstract shots of American- style malls with their fluo-
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rescent lighting (with one mall lobby displaying a replica of Paul Manship’s 
golden Prometheus statue from Rockefeller Center); the McDonald’s sign 
on which the camera lingers repeatedly; the exhortation by one of the death 
squad leaders to the amateur actors assembled for a critical scene depicting 
the rape, pillage, and burning of a village: “Think positive! Think positive!”
In 1965, General Suharto, with the support of Western govern-
ments, had led a successful coup in Indonesia against left- leaning presi-
dent Sukarno and began the mass killings immediately upon his assump-
tion of power, a period designated by him as the New Order. The coup was 
a response to the killing of six army generals by elite guards connected 
to President Sukarno, a group known as the 30 September Movement. 
Whether this event signified a mutiny internal to the army or had some 
other origin (including the CIA) remains open to debate, but it is clear that 
the army leaders in charge of the coup, with the barely concealed help of 
the CIA and the Pentagon, used the opportunity to destroy the Communist 
Party of Indonesia (the PKI). Not only did the army spearhead a media cam-
paign that saturated the airwaves and the newspapers with grisly tales of 
violent communist excess, but with assistance from its auxiliaries, including 
a paramilitary group populated by petty gangsters known as the Pemuda 
Pancasila, the army carried out mass killings, targeting “communists,” a 
label that included intellectuals, members of the communist party, as well as 
the ethnic Chinese. The death toll is contested, hovering between 500,000 
and over two million dead. Eventually, October 1 was proclaimed a national 
day of celebration, of the victory over communism. In 1984, the government 
released a four- hour propaganda film, entitled The Treachery of the Sep-
tember 30th Movement of the Indonesian Communist Party (Pengkhiana-
tan G 30 S/PKI; dir. Noer). The film was mandatory viewing in schools and 
played around the clock on television until Suharto’s resignation in 1998. It 
depicted the immensity of the communist threat, through a combination of 
thriller, detective, and slasher film codes, and lingered on all manner of vio-
lence in all its gory excess. Communists burn bodies with cigarette butts, 
wield razor blades on unsuspecting victims, kill parents in front of their chil-
dren and vice versa, et cetera. In the film, violence is committed largely by 
communists, but the film does not depict the mass killings of “communists” 
it is intended to justify. That unspoken justification is the film’s message, a 
message that crystallized the official narrative of the New Order as a trium-
phant period following the communist threat.9
9. I have drawn on Benedict Anderson’s and Joshua Oppenheimer and Michael Uweme-
dimo’s contributions in Brink and Oppenheimer 2013. Also see Lane 2008.
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In 2004, filmmaker Joshua Oppenheimer set out to make a film about 
the survivors of the genocide, the victims’ families, and the silence in Indo-
nesia surrounding the events of 1965–66. While working on this project, 
Oppenheimer and Anonymous, his codirector, learned from the families of 
victims that the death squad leaders were alive and well, and when he inter-
viewed them, they were happy to discuss what they had done, even boast-
ing to Oppenheimer about the number of people they had killed. Secrecy 
was unnecessary for them since they were on the side of the victors, and as 
hired assassins, they had killed with an impunity that had never been ques-
tioned. However, survivors and victims’ families have not enjoyed such a 
privilege, not only because such narration is always beset with psychologi-
cal difficulties for those affected by such immense losses but survivors and 
the victims’ families have been silenced in official and unofficial ways. The 
boastful volubility of one side resides, sometimes literally, right next door to 
the difficult silence of the other.
This is not to imply that the Indonesian state openly embraces the 
perpetrators. As Benedict Anderson notes in an essay concerning the 
death squad leaders based in Medan (the area of Indonesia featured in 
The Act of Killing and also in Oppenheimer’s follow- up documentary about 
the victims, The Look of Silence [2014]), these individual perpetrators were 
not without their disappointments: “One of these must have been lack of 
national- level recognition for their role in the massacres, the one moment 
in their otherwise humdrum criminal lives where they could imagine them-
selves as among the saviors of their country” (Anderson 2013: 281). The 
reigning national narrative was a paradoxical one: because communists 
were a threat, they needed to be crushed, and because they were a threat, 
the public at large sought to kill them, and the army merely tried to “secure” 
them from the anger demonstrated by the masses. In direct contradiction 
to actual events, the postgenocide national narrative cast the army in the 
role of the protector, its propaganda painting the army as the only bulwark 
against the waves of spontaneous violence unleashed by the killings of the 
six generals. No room in this narrative, therefore, for heroes who kill. The 
death squad leaders, who proudly refer to themselves as gangsters (more 
on this below), erected their own monuments: a thirty-foot chrome “66” near 
the railway station in Medan and an obelisk in the village, Kampung Kolam. 
Receiving neither wealth nor glory, the gangsters are aging nobodies—
as Anderson writes, “They are not ‘in national history,’ in a country where 
national history is very important, and national heroes abundant” (282).
Hence the gusto with which the gangsters engage in conversation 
about their violent deeds and the thrill with which they follow through on 
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Oppenheimer and the anonymous codirector’s suggestion that they restage 
their acts. The Act of Killing was originally screened in Indonesia privately 
on university campuses before its appearance at international film festi-
vals in 2012, and it eventually obtained a general release within Indonesia, 
under the title Jagal (Indonesian for “killer” or “butcher”).10 Its initial screen-
ings inspired Indonesian journalists to probe further into perpetrators’ nar-
ratives, and the prestigious Indonesian news magazine Tempo released a 
special issue on the massacres of 1965–66 (Tempo 2012). Within Indonesia 
itself, since the atrocities took place, there have been ongoing and diverse 
investigations into the massacres, including by Indonesia’s Human Rights 
Commission and the Coalition for Truth and Justice (a national network of 
forty- five organizations). After Suharto’s fall in 1998, there were some state 
efforts to acknowledge the past, including a call from the Upper House of 
Parliament for a truth and reconciliation commission; the law calling for this 
commission passed in 2004 but was annulled in 2006. In addition, the attor-
ney general stopped the efforts to rethink the school curriculum to present 
a more diverse account of Indonesian history. The four- year investigation 
by the Indonesian Human Rights Commission faced a stern denial by the 
head of the military in 2012 (see Wandita, n.d.).
While The Act of Killing is not the first exposé of the atrocities, it 
does bring an oft-forgotten history to a global spectatorship, and in doing so 
the film’s intervention is critical. Still, as Indonesian scholar Ariel Heryanto 
has remarked in his discussion of the film,
Truth and justice do not always prevail, and they do not necessarily 
arrive in the form or at a time desired by those who struggle in earn-
est for them. It is important for those who participate in the com-
mendable struggle to resist the seductive myth about the power of 
information, or the familiar assumptions about moral attributes of 
human beings in abstract and ideal terms—as if a truthful revelation 
about a massacre will galvanize a critical mass of people into action 
to demand justice. (Heryanto 2014: 163–64)
Heryanto notes that while whistle- blowers such as Chelsea Manning, 
Edward Snowden, and Julian Assange have garnered much sympathy, the 
10. Oppenheimer’s second film about the massacres, The Look of Silence, initially opened 
in Indonesia through large public screenings before the army banned such screenings. 
But, as in all parts of Asia, most film is circulated through informal networks of distribu-
tion and both films have been seen widely. Within Indonesia, the films are available for a 
free download through the distribution company (Drafthouse Films) website (O’Falt 2016).
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information released has hardly driven a groundswell of support for disman-
tling global military- industrial complexes, or much of anything else for that 
matter. Heryanto points to the strange relationship to knowledge that Indo-
nesia shares with the globe: the scandal is not that these atrocious things 
happened or are still happening and we do not know about them, but that 
we do know they are happening and we get on with our days nevertheless. 
As for Indonesia, while the country was subject to extreme censorship in 
the decades after the massacre, the Attorney General’s Office is no longer 
permitted to ban books or artworks without a trial. The activist- juridical 
struggle to excavate evidence for linking the massacres to state agents 
is an enormously important political struggle, and it happens against the 
background of a general tendency toward a “knowing unawareness” that 
characterizes contemporary global politics.
Given this context in which knowledge does not necessarily prevent 
violence, the very meaning of exposé has to be rethought. The documen-
tary helps us with this kind of rethinking, in part, by staging atrocity with 
all of its affective complexity. The Act of Killing condenses three frames of 
representation: (1) a documentary about the making of a film concerning 
the genocide; (2) the film within the film being made by the death squad 
leaders; (3) the genocide itself, the referent for both the first and the sec-
ond frame.11 There are moments within the documentary, especially in its 
second half, where the reenactments of the genocide carry the diegesis. In 
these scenes, the framing device signaling a film within a film disappears, 
and even though the documentary had made it clear that we are watching a 
scene that we had earlier seen being rehearsed, the combination of sound, 
close- ups, and medium shots thrusts the viewer directly in the midst of the 
action, making the reenactment “real.” The documentary establishes early 
on that we are watching reenactments, but then it invites the spectator to 
be taken in by the playacting. During these moments, when the reassur-
ance of a frame does not keep the reenacted scenes at a remove, the 
boundary between the past and the present thins out. This happens in the 
documentary at the narrative turn when the reenactments start to become 
increasingly disturbing for Anwar Congo; his experience and the audience’s 
experience are, formally, paralleled. Oppenheimer has referred to this film 
as a “fever dream” (Kiang 2015), an apt phrase to describe this effect of die-
getic blurring—the film within the film becoming all too real—one in which 
11. The criticism to date on this film tends to shuttle across these three frames as well. 
See Rich, ed. 2013; Tyson 2015.
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the past is reanimated and the effects of this reanimation resonate long 
after the credits roll.
Throughout, and more prominently in the longer “director’s cut” ver-
sion, transitions between critical scenes of the documentary take on an 
abstract character: a view of Medan’s rooftops at dusk, with a single figure 
climbing a pole; a tableau depicting a crashed plane in Indonesia; lonely 
windows of an American- style mall lit at night with an incidental McDon-
ald’s sign promising halal food in the lower right- hand corner; countless 
flitting birds that could be bats, feeding in crepuscular light; the same shot 
again as the documentary becomes more dreamlike, this time without the 
reassurance of a horizon line and with a darkening of the evening light. 
These transitional sequences are welcome respites in a documentary that 
reveals one horrific disclosure after another, often verbally or only by means 
of the gangsters playing dress- up. Yet in their abstraction, these sequences 
signal the work of metaphor so critical for Oppenheimer’s work; in The Look 
of Silence, a repeated image of seeds that seem to jump and tremble on 
a palm becomes a metaphor for the unrest and the possibility of speech 
for the survivors of the genocide, and even for the victims of the genocide. 
Metaphor plumbs the depths overwritten by time, depths that might have 
been overlooked but are not erased. Metaphor also becomes an ethics 
of representation, representing the dead (or more accurately, “presenc-
ing” them) without speaking for them. Moreover, it ranges across all three 
frames of representation I listed above, becoming a fourth that encom-
passes them all.
In all four cases, the aim is retrieval of the past, but not in the sense 
normally associated with the dictum “never forget.” Our voluble protago-
nists, the gangsters, seek to reveal all, to narrate in stunning detail the dif-
ferent methods of killing efficiently, cleanly, and with speed, and to act out 
once again their atrocities, this time (as Anwar Congo discovers) with feel-
ing. The work of retrieval and recovery is doubled in Oppenheimer’s docu-
mentaries concerning the genocide, attending as they do to the silences of 
fact in the Indonesian national narrative, but also to the recovery of emo-
tions previously unfelt by the perpetrators and the survivors alike. Both 
retrievals are within the ambit of politics, the former attempted by performa-
tive means (the existence and dissemination of the documentary itself, the 
opening up of a dialogue in Indonesia and globally about the genocide) and 
the latter by means of reenactment and play (the killers playing dress- up, 
a survivor disclosing the story of his murdered father then playing a victim 
in a scene). The complexity of this documentary requires a combination of 
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a theoretico- historiographical approach as well as an approach attuned to 
its aesthetics.
Probing the realm of fantasy is critical for both approaches, as it 
was fantasy itself that had underwritten the forms of violence originally 
committed and that underwrites the imaginative representation of the vio-
lence. This includes the fantasy of a masculinist will to power. Not only are 
the gangsters fashioning themselves after sadistic filmic types, but, more 
importantly, even when they are not “performing,” they are engaged in gen-
dered bravado or posturing: relating misogynist jokes, reminiscing about 
their excitement in 1965–66 at finding a young girl to rape, making patently 
sexual comments to women who are not in a position to complain about 
them (e.g., an assistant to the leader of Pamuda Pancasila who is carrying 
his golf equipment and needs to keep her job). This masculinist posturing 
is a layer of performance naturalized through repetition; it is a performance 
that continues with or without the camera. It suggests an underlying con-
tinuity in two directions: between the time of the genocide and the present 
time of the documentary; in front of the camera and in situations where 
there is no camera.
These reaffirmations of masculinity seem a little anxious in their 
investments in pushing masculinist logics to the extreme. Such a natural-
ized performance, too, relies on operations of fantasy. How to account for 
this element of the fantastical, whether in gender performance or in fantas-
tical play, within the space of a genocidal history? The brilliance of The Act 
of Killing lies in inventing a whole new visual language for the representa-
tion of unspeakable acts, and this visual language is attuned to restoring 
perceptibility in a televisual realm set to the rhythm of Twitter feeds and 
rife with images of grisly violence that often leave no lasting trace. It turns 
out that some of what is foreclosed by the psyche and never allowed to 
enter consciousness, and that which was once consciously experienced 
but then repressed—something of that which is tabled—can reemerge in 
new forms, affective and political, personal and collective. Not merely per-
formance and play but screens themselves can become vehicles for such 
transmutation.
3. This Time with Feeling
Screens and screening are at the heart of this documentary: not only 
the televisual screen but also other forms of mediation, including fantasy. In 
the death squad leaders’ own accounts, they styled themselves after Holly-
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wood heroes and villains. At the time of the mass killings, they worked as 
hired thugs in connection with cinemas, in charge of selling scalped tick-
ets and committing a host of petty crimes, available as mercenaries for all 
kinds of dirty work, including for organizations, such as Pemuda Pancasila, 
that continue to the present day to have informal links to the state. Alarmed 
by communist rhetoric against the importation of American films and the 
resulting threat to their livelihood, the young gangsters heeded the call to 
kill “communists” with impunity. In The Act of Killing, they emphasize that 
in 1965–66, they found inspiration in various Hollywood types, such as the 
gangster, the cowboy, the outlaw, and the film noir detective, and in the 
reenactments, they dress themselves up in elaborate costumes recalling 
these stock figures. At one point, Anwar Congo explains that they sought, 
in 1965–66, to outdo the most violent Hollywood films. Over the course 
of the documentary, we see scenes shifting from the reenactment of the 
atrocities to one of the killers watching that very reenactment on the tele-
vision screen. The play of mediation works at multiple levels: Hollywood 
archetypes and stock figures originally emulated by death squad leaders in 
1965; the remake of their acts by means of playing dress- up and perform-
ing; the watching of this reenactment on the television screen; and finally 
for the spectators of this documentary itself.
The documentary’s opening quickly highlights the sensuous, fantas-
tical nature of screens. We watch a slightly surreal sequence of a group of 
female dancers dressed identically, moving sinuously while emerging out of 
the mouth of an enormous fish- shaped building onto a platform, with a lake 
in the background. The camera cuts to additional dancers nearby, ranged in 
feathery regalia around a waterfall. All colors are overly saturated, empha-
sizing their jewel- like character, and the scene is rendered in soft focus, 
lending the spray from the waterfall an ethereal quality. It would be trans-
porting, especially given the sing- song humming on the soundtrack over 
the sounds of the waterfall, except a commanding voice intervenes, giving 
direction: “Peace! Happiness! Smile!”; “1, 2, 3, 4! Smile! More Teeth!”; 
“These are close- ups! Don’t let the camera catch you looking bad!”; “Real 
joy, not just pleasure!”; “And natural beauty! This isn’t fake!” The camera 
pans across the different dancers, each looking peaceful with open, out-
stretched arms, feathers astir, and settles on two central figures, also with 
outstretched arms: a man in drag and another man (we will come to know 
them, respectively, as Herman Koto and Anwar Congo). Suddenly every-
one breaks pose and set hands distribute blankets to the actors to warm 
themselves. The film cuts to one of its abstract transitional shots (a street 
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scene, then a mall’s exterior at night), with text giving us the skeletal infor-
mation about 1965–66: the military coup, the mass killings supported by 
the West, the use of paramilitaries and gangsters to carry out the mass kill-
ings, and the documentary’s central conceit: “When we met the killers, they 
proudly told us stories about what they did. To understand why, we asked 
them to create scenes about the killings in whatever ways they wished.”
Through these shots, and thus far with no real introduction to the 
gangsters, the documentary partakes of the surrealist logic of interruption: 
the scene at the waterfall is so vivid and being taken so seriously by the 
actors that it is difficult not to be taken in by its phantasmagoric visual plea-
sure, jewel colors and feathered headdresses included. Yet the emergence 
from the mouth of a fish feels distinctly bizarre, and the injunctions to smile 
and show teeth only makes one curious about the kind of documentary 
being made. The text signaling that this sequence is in a film “about the 
killings” only heightens curiosity about how this sequence might be con-
nected to those events. We receive an answer, rather powerfully, in a scene 
filmed early in Oppenheimer’s acquaintance with Anwar Congo, when 
Congo takes Oppenheimer to the rooftop of what is now a shop that sells 
cheap handbags and backpacks. Standing on the roof, Anwar explains, 
“There are many ghosts here, because many people were killed here. They 
died unnatural deaths.” He then proceeds to demonstrate the most efficient 
Figure 1. The Act of Killing, still from opening sequence. Courtesy of Final 
Cut for Real.
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method of killing people. “At first, we beat them to death, but there was too 
much blood,” Anwar explains, and then shows his preferred method of gar-
roting, using a piano wire, a stick, and an immobile pole. Anwar asks his 
friend to sit by the pole with his hands behind him (the victim’s hands would 
be tied), winds the wire around the friend’s neck, and feigns a pull using the 
stick tied to the wire at the other end. “This is how to do it without too much 
blood,” he says, and then confesses, “I’ve tried to forget all this with good 
music . . . dancing . . . feeling happy . . . a little alcohol, a little marijuana . . . 
a little ecstasy. . . . I’d fly and feel happy.” At that point Anwar smiles widely 
and breaks into a cha- cha dance; the camera cuts to a longer shot show-
ing Anwar dancing on the roof where he has executed more people than 
he can remember. His periodic snicker and his extended cha- cha music 
vocalization as he prances around the roof is a stark contrast to the horrific 
scenes he has just been describing.
The symmetrical counterpart of this scene is the final scene of the 
documentary, when we return to the same rooftop over a year later. In the 
meantime, Anwar and the other executioners have made an elaborate melo-
drama about the mass killings. On this return visit, Anwar admits openly, 
“I know it was wrong—but I had to do it.” While he discloses more details 
of the rooftop’s grisly history, something surprising happens: he begins 
to retch involuntarily. The dry heaving and the eventual vomit interrupt 
his words, but at no point does Anwar acknowledge his somatic reaction. 
There are moments when the guttural heaving sounds take over speech 
altogether, sometimes for up to uncomfortable lengths of time. When 
Anwar begins speaking again, he continues his thought as if his body had 
not just rebelled. We encounter in this scene a radical divide between soma 
and narrative. The extended scene of retching, of starting and stopping 
speech, of starting and stopping the heaving, becomes unnerving because 
it produces a sense of disgust in the spectator, or at the very least pro-
duces a certain discomfort that is the precise opposite of the visual plea-
sures afforded by the opening sequence. The disgust that the documentary 
has been gesturing to all along arrives on screen, and Anwar continues to 
ignore it even as his body heaves involuntarily.
To be sure, this is not the first instance of Anwar displaying symp-
toms of the enormity of his actions. In an earlier film noir style reenactment, 
Anwar has his victim lie on the table while he lies underneath, pulling on the 
two ends of the wire presumably wrapped around the victim’s neck. Anwar 
pulls with all his might, and then breathes hard, has trouble catching his 
breath, looks disturbed, and lets out guttural sounds. In another moment, 
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one in which Anwar is playing a victim being garroted by a Dick Tracey– 
styled Herman, similar involuntary guttural sounds emerge from his mouth 
before the wire is even pulled, sounds so concerning that Herman stops 
the scene, and Anwar’s hand simply shakes, repeatedly and involuntarily. 
The somatic response itself is a sign of the momentary failure of repres-
sion.12 The involuntary retching, the hand that won’t stop shaking, and the 
breath that seems to come only in shallow spurts: How does one read the 
bodily reactions in these moments? We might well long for a narrative arc 
for the film as a whole that leads from corruption, to killing, to remorse—the 
classic narrative arc—and the final scene has been repeatedly criticized 
for somehow “redeeming” Anwar Congo. However, all we see is a bodily 
response sometimes coupled with Anwar’s narration; reading the scene 
as redemptive hardly attends to its ambiguity and strangeness. Though the 
retching interrupts the words, it is a more ambiguous sign than it might 
appear. Also, remorse is not in itself redemption. Anwar says, “I know it was 
wrong—but I had to do it.” The killing, in other words, was a kind of compul-
sion, and soon after he says this, his body convulses and retches, though 
he tries to ignore it. An overwhelming somatic compulsion escapes his self- 
mastery and, once again, escapes rationality. This compulsion mimics the 
former compulsion to kill (“I had to do it”)—to that end, it is a repetition (and 
as symptom, a substitution) of a previous compulsion, a previous time, that 
interrupts the present, an unfolding of what Freud called Nachträglichkeit, 
an involuntary action that is a long- deferred response.13 It bears the tempo-
ral traces of transference, in which a past time comes alive in the present 
and reveals time itself to be nonlinear. At no point in this clip does Anwar 
Congo acknowledge the retching, though he is one of the more reflective of 
the killers in the documentary. Deferred action need not lead to knowledge. 
Perhaps in Anwar’s case, it eventually did, but, of course, knowledge, like 
remorse, is hardly absolution.
12. Freud argues that repression “demands a persistent expenditure of force,” such that 
“it is not the repression itself which produces substitutive formations and symptoms, 
but [. . .] these latter are indications of a return of the repressed and owe their existence 
to quite other processes” (Freud 1953c: 151, 154).
13. Homay King discusses repetition compulsion and fantasy in The Act of Killing in an 
insightful contribution to a dossier of short essays on the film, concluding that “fantasy 
can paradoxically be the route back to reality, performing the difficult work of opening 
doors to the past that were previously locked shut” (2013: 35). My argument concerning 
fantasy is in line with King’s thoughts, but I am less concerned here with routing fantasy 
to reality because in my account fantasy is not entirely opposed to reality.
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4. Screen Forms
If Anwar can be said to arrive at something like knowledge or even 
dawning awareness (because how can one know such enormity?), it feels, 
in part, related to the reenactments. These are reenactments of a previous 
performance, itself a kind of reenactment that happens at the moment of 
the original atrocity.14 The murders in 1965–66 were forms of deadly per-
formance themselves, since the perpetrators relied on genres, codes, and 
scripts of received representations of violence in the media. Oppenheimer 
and Uwemedimo note that just as in images of smiling American military 
personnel in Abu Ghraib photographs, “the gestures of murder and torture 
are and were already re- enactments, just as those smiling snapshot cli-
chés are pulled from a repertory of stock poses and therefore already and 
always repetitions” (2013: 295). These stock poses, genres, scripts, and 
forms of comportment made available in televisual streams might be use-
fully thought of as themselves different kinds of screens, making possible 
a new iteration and a form of projection even while withholding, screening 
out, something from the viewer and/or the performer.
Oppenheimer and Uwemedimo have described the film’s own cine-
matic strategy as one that deploys reenactment toward a “critical and inter-
ventionist historiography” (295).15 The Act of Killing is a document, there-
fore, of several events: it attaches the atrocities to particular perpetrators 
and to a particular organization; it tracks the process of working through 
the traumatic events of 1965–66; and it details a historical excavation of an 
event to counter that event’s official narrative.16 Recounting the details in 
14. Also, the men use stills from the propaganda film Pengkhianatan G 30 S/PKI to model 
their makeup as killers and as victims. So not only do the reenactments return to the per-
formance of the violence they committed in 1965–66, but the reenactments also reiterate 
the aforementioned film.
15. Oppenheimer and Uwemedimo have called this kind of critical reenactment “archaeo-
logical performance”: as a method of investigative filmmaking, it “entails successively 
working with and through the gestures, routines and rituals that were the motor of the 
massacres, as well as the genres and grammars of its historical recount. [. . .] Between 
a buried historical event and its restaging with historical actors, this method opens up a 
process of simultaneous historical excavation (working down the strata), and histrionic 
reconstruction (adding layers of stylized performance and recounting)” (2013: 304–5).
16. Not only have The Act of Killing and The Look of Silence opened a space for dialogue 
within Indonesia about the events of 1965–66, but Oppenheimer has presented these 
documentaries to the US Congress and requested that the United States admit its role in 
the killings or at least declassify documents pertaining to these events. There is, however, 
a disparity in the broad international acclaim these films have received and their limited 
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front of the camera or acting them out by means of performance changes 
the person doing the recounting and the acting, who brings out those 
aspects most suitable for the observing camera. The camera, in turn, cre-
ates out of this narration a record that is officially deemed not to exist.
Certainly the repetition of the performance has clear effects on 
Anwar himself, judging from his reactions in the first scene on the roof 
where he does the cha- cha, to the appearance of bodily disturbances dur-
ing the “filmmaking,” to the final scene of unacknowledged but punctuated 
retching. The reenactments are the very settings for fantasy, or, rather, the 
play space in which desire is enacted.17 Within this play space, they can 
fashion themselves as perpetrators, victims, husbands, wives, communists, 
capitalists, cowboys, drug lords, et cetera. Insofar as the reenactments 
refer to a previous performance, they also register past—or retrospective— 
fantasies, and the key fantasy in this regard for Anwar and others is to 
become a “gangster.” They use this term to refer to themselves because 
they are all members of the paramilitary organization called Pemuda Panca-
reception within Indonesia, where the audiences for the film are largely intellectuals and 
activists.
17. Joan Scott, citing Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, notes that “fantasy is 
the setting of desire” such that “in the fantasized setting the fulfillment of desire and the 
consequences of this fulfillment are enacted” (Scott 2011: 49).
Figure 2. Anwar Congo on television, from The Act of Killing. Courtesy of 
Final Cut for Real.
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sila, an organization directly involved in the mass killings of 1965–66 and 
whose leadership openly proclaims masculinist virtues of gangsterism.18 
The Indonesian word for gangster used by the organization’s membership 
is preman, and the documentary includes several speeches and conversa-
tions where it is explained that preman means, at bottom, “free man.”
The word preman has a checkered history in Indonesia. It is a trans-
position into Indonesian of the Dutch word vrijman, or “freeman,” but this 
word in the original Dutch colonial context was used to refer to a freed plan-
tation slave. By the early twentieth century, vrijman referred to an employee 
of the Dutch East India Company who worked as an independent contrac-
tor at the lower ranks: a coolie day laborer or noncontract overseer. The vrij-
man was free, in other words, by not being bound by a contract. A vrijman 
“is not in the service of the Dutch East India Company, but has permission 
to be in the Indies, and carries out trade for the sake of the [Company].”19 
From the turn of the twentieth century to Indonesian independence in 1945, 
vrijman referred to noncontracted laborers as well as thugs hired by the 
company to supplement police power. The vrijman was free but somehow 
tied to the company, insofar as he was meant to be involved in the com-
pany’s commercial pursuits. This is indeed a strange form of freedom, well 
articulated by the head of Pemuda Pancasila, Yapto Soerjosemarno, in a 
1993 interview:
Preman means a free person, exactly free- man, I am one of these. 
A preman is a person who is free, not tied by any knot, free to deter-
mine his own life and death, as long as he fulfills the requirements 
and the laws of this country. But I am free to choose, to carry out 
the permitted or the not permitted, with all of its risks. For example, 
if you’re a thief, you take the risks of being a thief, meaning if you’re 
caught, you’re finished. If you aren’t caught, you’re no thief, right? 
Legally that’s the way it is; we hold to the principle of the presump-
tion of innocence. (Quoted in Ryter 1998: 51)
The presumption of innocence protects the preman and creates a space 
of freedom outside the law that he might inhabit; a presumption originally 
18. Pemuda Pancasila literally means “Pancasila Youth.” Pancasila means “five prin-
ciples,” and these are taken by official Indonesian nationalism to be (1) belief in one God; 
(2) justice; (3) unity; (4) democracy; and (5) freedom. While Pemuda Pancasila openly 
embraces gangsterism, the word preman has a wider purview and is used by people even 
if they are not members of Pemuda Pancasila.
19. Documents of the Dutch East India Company, cited in Ryter 1998: 50–51.
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intended to secure the law’s objectivity by protecting the accused from pre-
determined judgments becomes another way of inhabiting one’s impunity. 
Pemuda Pancasila, a paramilitary organization, is not officially a part of the 
state apparatus, and yet it is synced into that apparatus; it is not itself the 
law, but it bears a relationship to it. “Legally that’s the way it is”: a thief not 
caught is not a thief; a killer never accused of murder is not a killer. Impunity 
is secured not by means of a juridical judgment but by means of withholding 
that judgment. Impunity is the obscene underside of the quotidian opera-
tions of the law, and as such it is the rule and not an exception.20
Preman as a term survives Indonesian coloniality and enters post-
coloniality, with its meanings shifting as it goes. Indonesian history has 
demonstrated that the slide from vrijman to preman to gangster/free man 
is hardly an itinerary marked with mistranslation. Preman sets the horizon 
of expectation for the men—it names what they simultaneously are, strive 
to become, and justifies all past illegal actions. Premanism is a form of self- 
fashioning, a screen or a transferential schema upon which masculinist 
fantasies of domination can be projected and justified, and it makes avail-
able a set of vices to be cultivated. The preman can be marshaled in the 
service of state violence and need not be seen—by others or himself—as 
a state agent. It would seem that the preman is, in truth, a deictic figure 
pointing to an agency that mobilizes him for its own ends, to a gangster-
ism whose actions he happily carries out. In 1965–66, this agency was 
split between the Indonesian state and also the superpowers of the Cold 
War, who required bloodbaths to sanctify their own notions of freedom. The 
obscene underside of the law, the preman as a figure of impunity is the 
excessive supplement to the public face of the spread of democracy and 
its presumptive legal equality among persons before the law. The freedom 
the preman believes he is enacting turns out to be as phantasmagoric as 
the fever dream of a film the perpetrators are making with Hollywood arche-
types in the tropics. The violence he enacts is of his own will but also of 
20. The phrase “obscene underside” is Žižek’s, from his discussion of Abu Ghraib images 
and the torture they revealed: “While they cannot be reduced to simple evil acts by indi-
vidual soldiers, they were of course also not directly ordered—they were legitimized by a 
specific version of the obscene ‘Code Red’ rules. [. . .] There are no formal orders, nothing 
is written, there is just unofficial pressure, hints and directives are delivered in private, the 
way one shares a dirty secret. . . . [. . .] In being submitted to humiliating tortures, the Iraqi 
prisoners were in effect initiated into American culture, they got the taste of its obscene 
underside which forms the necessary supplement to the public values of personal dignity, 
democracy, and freedom” (Žižek 2009a: 370). Also see Žižek 2009b.
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the will of agents far removed from him, sovereign powers (however medi-
ated) who can decide on his field of action. His freedom is, in other words, 
a screen form.21 The permission to kill with impunity feels like a kind of lib-
eration, an age- old fantasy made real.
This is the context in which Anwar’s account of “having fun” while 
killing has to be situated—the ludic, unserious aspect of the killings he 
describes are a part of a free and youthful self- fashioning. According to the 
killers’ narration in the documentary, in 1965–66 they were emulating Holly-
wood villains, and therefore “playing at” being themselves—that is, death 
squad killers. Or perhaps they felt they had escaped from being “death 
squad” leaders by playing at being themselves—that is, “mimic men” of 
Hollywood’s sadism. Whether the screen form facilitated some kind of self- 
knowledge or whether it facilitated its concealment can never be deter-
mined in this instance, and not least because the gangsters’ collective 
account that they tried to act like film characters might well be a retro-
spective projection, a generative screen memory in the classic Freudian 
sense.22 But the ultimate referent—the genocide—is broached by means of 
further mimetic acts, and this playacting lends insight into the past.
These mimetic acts are all screen forms in their own way: the emu-
lation of stock Hollywood archetypes; shots of Anwar combing his hair, 
placing his dentures in his mouth carefully; Herman, in preparation for his 
run in the local election, watches Barack Obama’s speeches and practices 
melodramatic oratorical gestures in the mirror. The most jarring of these 
screen moments occurs near the end of the movie, when we return to the 
waterfall song sequence, this time without the framing device of shouted 
directorial instruction. We hear the theme song “Born Free,” from the 1966 
film of the same name (about English benevolence in Kenya), the soft- 
focus spray of the waterfall obscures shapes but all colors are heightened, 
the dancers are resplendent in their costumes, and, as the refrain of “Born 
Free” resolves, we cut to two bedraggled- looking men. These men lift inter-
connected circles of piano wire coiled around both of their necks and drop 
the wire on the ground, and one of them reaches into his pocket to retrieve 
a medal. The camera reveals Anwar standing right next to that man, looking 
beatific, and the “victim” places the medal around Anwar’s neck and says, 
21. The term screen form is not intended to suggest the phrase “merely screen form.” In 
fact, I mean this term in precisely the opposite direction, in that I am interested in all that 
screen forms make possible, transform, generate, efface, highlight, distort, and create.
22. See “Screen Memories” (1899) (Freud 1953d).
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“For executing me and sending me to heaven . . . I thank you a thousand 
times, for everything.” The camera cuts to a long shot showing all the fig-
ures ranged around the waterfall, arms outstretched.
Immediately, even as “Born Free” continues in the background, 
we cut to Anwar watching this sequence on his television. He loves the 
sequence and is genuinely moved by it. The screen is a complex surface, 
both a site of projective creation and replication but also a site of exclusion, 
in the sense that screens “screen out” certain elements. Within the nar-
rative of this documentary, the screen has to be read in all of its senses: 
the templates of Hollywood sadism are screen forms of intense transfer-
ence for Anwar Congo and the other death squad leaders. As such, we 
might think of them as transitional objects, in the classically psychoanalytic 
sense: it is an object of play, mediates relations between “me” and “not 
me.”23 The screen forms—the film noir gangster, the Wild West outlaw—
are simultaneously given to Anwar Congo and created anew by him. They 
originate in Hollywood but are also conjured by him, both in 1965 and then 
again when he reenacts them. To consider the ludic aspect of this geno-
cide means to consider the forms of fantasy that, in part, turned killing into 
a kind of sport or at least a kind of playacting. The screen as a transitional 
object is a site of creative projection, and it leaves oneself transformed.
The reenactments churn something of an experience that was not 
allowed to enter his consciousness when first experienced, judging from 
the classic trauma symptoms he displays over the course of the documen-
tary. Doing the cha- cha on the rooftop where he killed hundreds of people 
and later in the film uncontrollably retching in that same place are sym-
metrical moments, each engaging the disgust and horror that cannot be 
admitted to consciousness. It would be tempting to read into the documen-
tary a certain redemptive strand of thinking about screens and mediation, 
about playacting and performance. Such a reading might conclude that 
screens—televisual, transferential, fantastical—simultaneously provide the 
possibility of grasping our embeddedness in regimes of violence while also 
making available the means to dissemble such complicity from ourselves 
as well as from others. Performance and play, in such a reading, would hold 
out the possibility of knowledge but not guarantee it. The documentary can 
23. Of this object, Winnicott writes, “It is a matter of agreement . . . that we will never ask 
the child the question: ‘Did you conceive of this or was it presented to you from without?’ 
The important point is that no decision on this point is expected. The question is not to be 
formulated” (2005: 17).
Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/boundary-2/article-pdf/45/4/65/543368/0450065.pdf
by PRINCETON UNIVERSITY LIBRARY user
on 06 October 2018
86 boundary 2 / November 2018
certainly be read this way, but the paradoxes and possibilities that such a 
reading produces feel overly familiar and comfortable. Instead, what if one 
reads this documentary as asking questions rather than resolving them? 
What if we read the final scene with Anwar Congo uncontrollably retching 
on the hallowed/profaned rooftop as an emblem for understanding a crisis 
in the global distribution of affect—to put it pointedly, at the absence of dis-
gust by people who have caused suffering, whether directly in proximity 
to the victim or remotely by means of various geopolitical screens? Recall 
Ariel Heryanto’s observation that exposés of corruption or violence do not 
necessarily lead to political action or social change. Such quiescence might 
indicate a widespread experience of the split between soma and narrative, 
the very split that Anwar demonstrates in spite of himself. As he lurches 
around the rooftop, telling stories interrupted by retching, or interrupting 
his somatic responses with stories, the scene becomes an allegory for a 
global malaise in which affect and narrative seem to inhabit parallel worlds 
in the same persons. Anwar’s retching and heaving is the end of one char-
acter’s arc in the documentary, but there are two other protagonists, even if 
they are minor with respect to Anwar’s leading narrative role: Herman Koto 
and Adi Zulkadri. The last we see of Herman, he is screaming continuously 
while repeatedly pounding a drum set, in one of the abstract intervening 
shots. The last we see of Adi, who is magically free of symptoms that might 
be traced back to his deeds, he is staring off into space while seated in a 
shopping mall. Anwar’s retching on the roof would have us consider the 
possibility that Nachträglichkeit—deferred action—is a sort of solution.
5. Enjoyment
Symptoms, for all their belatedness, do point to a disturbance that 
can be excavated or played out again in controlled surroundings. Whether a 
character displays symptoms or lacks symptoms altogether, we never lose 
sight in The Act of Killing of a certain objectivity, that mass killings occurred 
and that impunity has been in force since then. Somatic experiences bear 
a relationship to objective realities, and it is worth excavating the histori-
cally specific forms of that relationship. Insofar as symptoms are repeti-
tions (with a difference) of a previous event, they provide critical openings 
for understanding those events. We find out in the later film, The Look of 
Silence, that some death squad leaders in 1965–66 developed mental dis-
turbances even at the time they were engaged in killing. Alongside reports 
of killers going insane, there also circulated a rumor about a prophylactic 
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remedy against such insanity: to drink some portion of the victim’s blood, 
thus incorporating into yourself the power of your victims. One death squad 
leader claimed the evidence of his total equanimity as proof that this magi-
cal rite did indeed work. In The Act of Killing, it is Adi who—said to have 
murdered and tortured as many people as Anwar—seems to display no 
symptoms (as far as the camera can see, in any case) and has complete 
awareness that what he did was wrong. Adi’s imperturbability makes sense 
in the light of The Look of Silence, in which we learn that the perpetrators 
continue to spread rumors about their prowess in killing. These intimidat-
ing rumors about having participated in the mass killings let others know 
that these men are likely protected and should not be wronged. In addition 
to parroting the idiom of officialdom by erecting their own monuments (the 
number 66 near Medan’s railway station), the killers have constructed their 
own form of fragmentary mythology, based on rumor, hearsay, and stories 
of magical powers. Well before Oppenheimer arrived on the scene to ask 
questions about their actions, it is clear, especially in The Look of Silence, 
that the killers are used to recalling the stories, and the narration some-
times feels as routine as the killings they committed. Concerning this rou-
tine narration, Oppenheimer and Uwemedimo write,
Indeed, these stories are told in the register of sadis.24 The enthu-
siastic recounting of the sadis conjures, for the killer, an ultimate, 
metaphysical and magical power over death. It is a power to be rel-
ished, savored, by rehearsing again and again the grisly details. 
Thus, through the genre of sadis, may killers perform themselves 
not just as victors and appropriators of the PKI’s projected powers, 
but as men of preternatural strength with an ilmu (or magical knowl-
edge) far greater than that of their victims. (2013: 297)
If the narration of their deeds perpetuates the fantasy of mastering death, 
this fantasy’s history goes back to the events of 1965–66. Ilmu names the 
kind of knowledge that intersects with brutal force, a critical blindness that 
allows one to kill quickly (Adi notes at one point, “Killing is something you 
do fast”). In the context of these films’ discourse, ilmu is both a condition 
of masculinist impunity and also its result. If impunity can be understood 
as a promissory note of violence, then sadis and ilmu ratify that prom-
ise as a sort of signature, the former in the profane world of rumor and 
the latter in the sacred order of mystical knowledge. In The Act of Killing, 
when Herman, bizarrely acting as a corpulent overdressed communist wife 
24. This word is an Indonesian appropriation of sadist.
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(the impoverished, skinny, and terrified village woman is too unglamorous 
a figure), literally eats a stage prop—an animal’s liver—even though the 
scene as the killers planned it did not include this action,25 he acts from an 
inertia created by the act of performance itself. I will take up the question 
of performance and reenactment more fully below, but for the moment it is 
important to note that eating the liver marks a kind of death that goes above 
and beyond mere death for the victim, and for the perpetrator, it marks a 
corollary domination that does not end with death. Such power—like the 
sexual instinct in Freud’s formulation—requires that he override disgust, 
biting voraciously into the raw liver. The perpetrator has a power over mere 
death, both of others and also his own.
This fantasy of a mastery over death is one that Fanon also recorded 
in the very different context of colonial Algeria. His clinical work can be read 
as investigations into forms of impunity. His insights into the psychology of 
violence and the symptomatology of imperial war are also insights into the 
psychology of impunity. Fanon was conducting his clinical work in the very 
years leading up to the atrocities in Indonesia, and his case studies are 
instructive for understanding Anwar Congo and his peers. Fanon’s clinical 
experience in treating colonial subjects demonstrates that symptoms are 
social formations, crystallizations of the negativity that underwrites social 
relations.26 As a clinician, Fanon attended to patients on both sides of the 
colonial divide, and “Colonial War and Mental Disorders” in The Wretched 
of the Earth includes case studies of both French and Algerian people: a 
resistance fighter suffering from impotence after his wife is raped by the 
French; an Algerian survivor of a mass killing by the French army struggles 
with newly emergent homicidal tendencies; an Algerian man whose mother 
was killed by a French officer murders a French woman; a white European 
who tortured people suspected of being involved with the FLN suffers from 
extreme anxiety (in the form of auditory hallucinations of screams); another 
European police officer tortures his family at home and tortures others at 
work. Fanon’s case studies of those who commit violence and the symp-
toms they display have much to teach us about the forms of being that 
Anwar Congo and his cohorts enact and reenact.
25. This is made clear in the director’s commentary on the DVD edition.
26. There has been a renewed interest in Fanon’s clinical writings. Anthony Alessandrini 
and Azeen Khan have demonstrated how Fanon’s clinical writings, including the under-
read chapter of The Wretched of the Earth entitled “Colonial War and Mental Disorders,” 
present more nuanced understandings of violence than often imputed to him (see Ales-
sandrini 1999, 2014; Lee 2015; Onwuanibe 1983; Melas 1999; Khan forthcoming).
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If Fanon’s revolutionaries—who, under the quotidian violence of 
colonialism, are not left with other viable political options—marshal nega-
tivity in the service of their emancipation, this negativity risks overreach-
ing and landing in a space beyond the pleasure principle, an experience 
that Lacan would call “enjoyment,” an experience that winds up mirroring 
the sadism of colonial violence. Psychoanalytically speaking, the revulsion 
expressed by a white person’s statement “Look, a Negro!” and the pitfalls of 
postcolonial nationalist consciousness (among them, state violence com-
mitted by postcolonial regimes) enact forms of enjoyment, or jouissance, 
or, at the very least, point to the excessive place toward which desire tends. 
In Seminar 7 in The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, Lacan argues that instead of 
grounding ethics in “the good,” the properly ethical relation to the other is 
to grant the other the space to recognize their singular jouissance, and to 
know that the impossible, unnameable, and destructive thing toward which 
desire tends is what I share with the other, and this Thing is singular and 
nonexchangeable for each of us. In the space of a psychoanalytic session, 
this would mean that the analysand is brought to the brink of knowledge 
about his or her own desire and to an acceptance that it tends past plea-
sure toward jouissance, a category that “implies precisely the acceptance 
of death” (Lacan 1992: 189). This is death both of the object of desire and 
of one’s own consumption in this object, which telescopes and focuses 
the world in all of its heterogeneity into a single (impossible) point. Jouis-
sance veers past the very distinction between pleasure and pain into a 
space beyond meaning, self- definition, and the law. Insofar as it derives its 
energies from the logics of brute matter that is the world and the people in 
it, jouissance shares in the organic pulsions of the drives, pressures that 
might become legible as compulsions. That is to say, the split between 
soma and narrative is the very ground of jouissance. The force of enjoy-
ment is double- edged: an intermingling of pleasure and pain, consumption 
and destruction, self-preservation and self- destruction.27 As with (somatic) 
drives, consciousness negotiates experiences of jouissance by means of 
27. In an essay about the grisly stories his father would tell him about his wartime experi-
ence, psychoanalyst Donald Moss speculates on how the narration of violent deeds 
makes the ambiguous pleasure of violence available to listener and recounter: “So this, 
then, is, I guess, one of the harms engendered by war stories. Maybe all war stories are 
told by fathers to sons. You can’t know that. When you encounter the admonition to ‘First, 
do no harm’ you are meant to know, as a matter of course, what harm is. But here, in 
these stories my father told me, in my housing them now, in my telling them, I cannot dis-
tinguish pleasure from harm” (Moss 2010: 247).
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the suturing work of fantasy, including fantasmatic identifications with par-
ticular figures or with narratives, anything that will rid the subject of the 
radical terror and alienation to which enjoyment leads.28 Such fantasmatic 
forms are what I have been calling screen forms, and the genre of sadis 
and the acquisition of ilmu in the context of the afterlife of the genocide in 
Indonesia operate as these screen forms. As fantasies, they are simulta-
neously access points for jouissance, or enjoyment, and they also rescue 
the subject from the void that underlies that experience.
In one of his case studies, Fanon describes a nineteen- year- old 
former Algerian soldier who arrives at the clinic displaying severe symp-
toms: unshakable insomnia, dissociation, periodic inability to speak, and 
two suicide attempts. The patient lived in fear of a woman who he claimed 
would come to persecute him. Fanon notes that he had already learned of 
this patient’s dead mother, of whom the patient was extremely fond: “When 
I asked him to describe this woman who was haunting, even persecuting, 
him he told me she was no stranger, that he knew her very well and he was 
the one who had killed her” (Fanon 2004: 192). Fanon explains that, given 
this information as a clinician, he set out to discover whether “we were in 
the presence of an unconscious guilt complex after his mother’s death, as 
Freud has described in his Mourning and Melancholia” (193). What Fanon 
discovers is something much more staggering. The patient’s mother “had 
been killed at point- blank range by a French soldier, and two of [his] sisters 
taken to the [French] barracks.” One day he was sent with his compatriots 
to a French colonialist’s estate because the French man had killed two 
Algerian civilians.
It was night when we arrived at his house. But he wasn’t at home. 
Only his wife was in the house. On seeing us, she begged us not to 
28. Lacan’s thinking about jouissance is informed by Freud’s discussion of the drives in 
his 1915 essay, “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes.” There, Freud discusses how the Trieb 
(or drive, mistranslated as “instinct”) latches on to an object in order to achieve satisfac-
tion, and this object might be an external thing or the subject’s own body. The drive trans-
mutes in the following ways: “reversal into its opposite, turning round upon the subject’s 
own self, repression, sublimation” (Freud 1953b: 125). Lacan’s discussion of enjoyment 
dovetails with his critique of the commandment to love one’s neighbor, his assertion that 
Sade reveals a truth that Kant’s categorical imperative makes impossible for thought, and 
his reworking of Freud’s reflections on the death drive. His discussion of Sade is a slightly 
different reading from Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno’s earlier and related claim in 
Dialectic of Enlightenment that Kantian morality shares the form of Sadean morality, as 
figured by Juliette and her interlocutors (2007: 63–93).
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kill her: “I know you have come for my husband,” she said, “but he 
isn’t here . . . [. . .]” We decided to wait for the husband. But I kept 
looking at the woman and thinking of my mother. She was sitting in 
an armchair and her thoughts seemed to be elsewhere. I was asking 
myself why we didn’t kill her. And then she noticed I was looking at 
her. She threw herself on me screaming: “Please . . . don’t kill me . . . 
I’ve got children.” The next minute she was dead. I’d killed her with 
my knife. (193, italics mine)
After this incident, the young man vomits after every meal. While under 
Fanon’s care, he is besieged by repeated nightmares of his room being 
invaded by women, each the same woman, each with a wound in her stom-
ach, and each asking that he return their spilled blood. While, after weeks 
of clinical treatment, the nightmares disappear, “his personality, however, 
remains seriously flawed. As soon as he thinks of his mother, this dis-
emboweled woman looms up disconcertingly in her place” (Fanon 2004: 
194).29 The overlap between his own beloved mother and the woman he 
kills persists at the time of the killing, at the time when he narrates the 
events to Fanon, and even after his time at the clinic is finished. It is impos-
sible in this event to dissociate revenge killing from a killing as a result 
of the aggression that is part and parcel of filial love. How to understand 
the politics of race and colonial war when the child’s greatest wish and 
greatest fear, that parents instantly die or disappear, is interwoven through 
it? The murder satisfies multiple overlapping wishes, and these overlaps 
muddy the easy Manichean thinking that colonialism generates. The mur-
der, in this instance, is the very frisson of enjoyment, and enjoyment here 
extends well past the event itself: the dreams in which the white mother/
Algerian mother returns, multiplied into a horde, and the satiation and hor-
ror of being bled dry by these doppelgängers. The fact that the murder itself 
takes such little time points to the true aim of enjoyment, for which the mur-
der was not in itself the real, or only, aim. The true satisfaction of enjoyment 
can occur only in the young man’s dream: “the sound of rushing water filled 
the room and grew so loud it seemed like a thundering waterfall, and the 
young patient saw the women slowly get their color back and their wounds 
began to close” (194). Desire is a gift that gives unto death.
This case study shows that if practicing impunity means to be exempt 
from one’s own finitude, this fantasy of mastering death conceals a wish to 
29. Fanon ends this case study tersely and inadequately: “As unscientific as it may seem, 
we believe only time may heal the dislocated personality of this young man” (2004: 194).
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embrace it. It certainly explains the ease with which Herman cannibalizes 
his victim—the liver is raw, and the fact of its rawness underscores it as 
dead. Similarly, the unflinching way in which death squad leaders claim 
they drank their dead victims’ blood in The Look of Silence also speaks 
to his embrace and incorporation of dead matter, dead subjects, into one-
self. What better figure of enjoyment than the drinking of the victim’s blood, 
which becomes the fantasy object around which jouissance might find sat-
isfaction, the rescue rope in a trajectory that would end with one’s own 
obliteration. The vicissitudes of enjoyment are such that the desire/fear 
(these cannot be disentangled) to be annihilated is replaced with a fantasy 
of escaping one’s own death.
In another case study of Fanon’s, enjoyment takes the form of tor-
ture: a French police inspector comes to Fanon and asks him “in plain lan-
guage to help him torture Algerian patriots without having a guilty con-
science [. . .] and with a total peace of mind” (199). Torture takes a very 
different toll on the torturer, a toll that might nevertheless help us under-
stand the kinship between the two positions in this drama.30 Lacan notes, in 
his reading of Sade, that the aim of torture is “to retain the capacity of being 
an indestructible support,” and the subject does this by means of generat-
ing a fantasy: “the subject separates out a double of himself who is made 
inaccessible to destruction” (Lacan 1992: 261). So we have isolated two 
forms of fantasy: the fantasy of one’s own annihilation (as in the first case 
study), and the fantasy of escaping one’s own death by means of separat-
ing out a double of oneself. Both screen forms are mechanisms by means 
of which the subject attempts to rid itself (successfully or unsuccessfully) of 
the radical horror at the heart of jouissance.
Fanon, like Freud, worked at the very heart of a central paradox for 
politics: How does one account for the negativity that seems foundational in 
human relations even as one works toward the dream of a better future?31 
30. Psychoanalysis helps us to understand that it is the relation in each transaction that 
bears out the truth of the situation, and not only this or that position within it. See “A Child 
Is Being Beaten” in Freud 1953a.
31. The ethical relation between self and other as suggested by Fanon is sometimes 
the very mechanism for thinking solidarity and a new humanism, and at other times a 
figure of failure of ethics itself in the radical incommensurability between neighbors (the 
Algerian quarter and the French quarter), or between corrupt postcolonial state agents 
and the people they exploit. At stake is the age- old concern with one’s relation to one’s 
neighbor, and in Fanon’s iteration of this ethical drama, difference radically bisects the 
relation. Also, Fanon’s account of colonial modernity demonstrates that the traumas of 
racial wounding do not necessarily lead to the rise of a beneficent nationalist conscious-
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The Act of Killing, too, is centrally concerned with ethics, and its medita-
tion on ethics takes the form of the camera’s focus on bodily symptoms: 
the hand that shakes involuntarily, the throat that lets out guttural animal 
sounds, the body that repeatedly heaves and retches. Ethics is, in part, a 
somatic matter.32
6. Play
There are scenes in the documentary that have an affinity to psycho-
analytic sessions. Anwar is the analysand par excellence, displaying symp-
toms without acknowledging them. Watching the scene of himself being 
tortured, he remarks,
ANWAR. But I can feel it, Josh. Really, I feel it. (Pauses.) Or have I 
sinned? (Pauses, and when he speaks, he is on the verge of tears.) I 
did this to so many people, Josh. Is it all coming back to me? (Weep-
ing.) I really hope it won’t. I don’t want it to Josh. (Oppenheimer 
2012)
ness. Fanon is attentive to the psychological mechanisms whereby the racialized subject 
comes to inhabit the categories of identity and difference received from the encounter, 
and such inevitable inhabitation leads to forked paths: to solidarity and collective eman-
cipation or to an unhappy consciousness fatally divided against itself, an unhappiness 
stemming from collective hapless emulation of “racially superior” forms of being.
32. In addition, some of Anwar’s neighbors were people he killed; Adi recalls killing his 
girlfriend’s father when he happened across him on the street, dumping the body over 
a bridge into the river. The survivors of the genocide and the families of the victims live 
among the aging gangsters who murdered their loved ones. What it means to be neigh-
borly continues to be a central ethical problem in the age of mediatized warfare. Warfare 
and neighborliness were among the critical preoccupations for Freud, especially in Civili-
zation and Its Discontents, where Freud critiques the ethical demand to love one’s neigh-
bor as oneself. For both Freud and Fanon, loving one’s neighbor becomes a deeply mis-
leading precept—the negativity that haunts the neighborly relation crystallizes in racism, 
with all its attendant state- institutional, military, and economic machinery. State violence 
is not only on the margins of Freud’s text but is written into his fundamental proposi-
tions concerning aggression between groups of people. Lacan, in a 1960 seminar, also 
emphasizes that the neighbor can hardly be a stable ground for ethics because “it is from 
this fellow as such that the misrecognitions which define me as a self are born” (Lacan 
1992: 198). Fanon’s wager in The Wretched of the Earth was to harness the generative 
force of the negativity that concerns Freud and deploy it in the service of emancipation, 
a task risky not only because it amounts to a struggle to death but also because the 
negativity thus unleashed might overreach—hence his cautionary account of nationalist 
consciousness.
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The scene ends with a shot- reverse- shot, between the end of the reenact-
ment, which shows an unresponsive Anwar- the- victim, and cuts to Anwar 
watching the scene with teary eyes. Quickly afterward, we are on the roof-
top for the documentary’s final sequence, where Anwar reflects on his 
actions and cannot stop retching. The documentary suggests that it might 
not be possible to answer Anwar’s questions, and if the camera can reveal 
Anwar’s symptoms, the knowledge we might gain from them is up for ques-
tioning. There are critical differences, ultimately, between clinical sessions 
and the experimental reenactments of The Act of Killing. While both require 
attaching some narrative, no matter how disjointed, to oneself, phenomeno-
logically the reenactments are of a different order altogether than the talk-
ing cure. These differences have to do with bodily reenactments, the media-
tion of the camera, and the circulation and reception history of the film 
itself. Ultimately the reenactments emphasize soma over narrative, and 
the cinematic apparatus, too, aims at managing the audience’s somatic 
responses. Anwar’s tearful question “Have I sinned?” seems an admission 
that he has. But given the presence of the camera, one must ask, Where 
does performance begin or end? As I noted earlier, some performances, 
such as masculinist impunity, seems to have no beginning or end. There 
is also a key difference between performance and reenactment: the latter 
being all manner of performance (such as gender) that repeats and sedi-
ments over time, and the former involving playing dress- up and acting out 
the past once again. Since both require acting “as if,” how do we read the 
bubbling up of somatic symptoms throughout the reenactments and in the 
final scene of Anwar on the roof?
After all, the documentary has already demonstrated that the killers 
are very adept at acting “as if”—in 1965–66, they really might have acted 
as if they were glorious film heroes vanquishing communists even as they 
received their orders from the government, who would send them lists of 
names of people to be killed; they killed all manner of people as if these 
people were all enemies; they have been playing dress- up and acting “as if” 
with great fanfare throughout the film. Given these various forms of disclo-
sures and dissembling, the final sequence is radically open- ended: it could 
signify the return of the repressed, or it might mark the significant crowning 
end of a Hollywood narrative of redemption, a demand that Anwar, who has 
assimilated so many televisual codes of being, might well desire to meet.33 
“Acting out” and “working through” form an ambiguous continuum.
33. Jill Godmilow, in a scathing review of The Act of Killing, puts it thus: “I trust that I am 
not the only one in the audience who has speculated that Congo felt he owed the Ameri-
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Given this ambiguity between the authentic/genuine bodily response 
and the bodily response that obeys a script (or plays its part), the film ren-
ders the distinctions between authentic/fake, performance/reenactment, 
reality/fantasy to be ultimately undecidable. Yet he who confesses to pos-
sessing ilmu on Oppenheimer’s camera does create a record of confession 
in which he attaches the murder not to an abstract force but to himself as 
an individual. Indeed, Oppenheimer and Uwemedimo (2013) argue that the 
cinematic apparatus transforms the routine detailing of sadis into a record 
in a historical situation where no records are deemed to exist of any such 
atrocities. Ilmu, that magical knowledge, transmutes into evidence, and the 
truths these perpetrators might withhold from themselves have a chance of 
being grasped by others.
On the other hand, while Oppenheimer is correct that the film itself 
serves as evidence since it attaches the confession of terrible atrocities to 
individual agents, such a veridical discourse remains at the level of narra-
tive, or logos. For a juridical process that might one day approximate jus-
tice, such emphasis on the word makes good activist sense. The film’s own 
cinematic strategies, however, never lose sight of the somatic as it articu-
lates with narrative. Enjoyment is a profoundly somatic experience, along 
with the symptoms produced if one survives it. Paradoxically—and this is 
the key to the perpetrators’ form of enjoyment—they deal death as a way of 
escaping their own death. That is, the fantasy of escaping their own death 
becomes the destination and the point of departure for enjoyment. This is 
the fantasy of the ultimate state of exception and impunity, of living outside 
the bounds of the law but also outside the limits of a drama bookended 
by birth and death. Ilmu gained from drinking blood is another variant of 
the same fantasy. The self- doubling that Lacan speaks about takes mul-
tiple forms in The Act of Killing, and it shares the very form of identification 
film spectators have to superheroes, villains, and all manner of protago-
nists who escape pain and death. The death squad leaders only appear 
to be limit cases. At bottom, they register a fantasy that every consumer 
of cinema has likely indulged at some point: the fantasy of escaping one’s 
can filmmaker an ending, and delivered it.” The problem with Godmilow’s reading (and 
there are others like it) is that it assumes the final sequence is a kind of wish fulfillment—
that is to say, that we can read the symptom as somehow redemptive. My own reading 
leaves room for this important possibility, but I find the final sequence more ambiguous 
than Godmilow. I am less interested in reading the retching as redemptive than in the 
sharpening of the distinction between soma and narrative as shown in the final sequence 
(Godmilow 2014).
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own death, of that ultimate state of exemption. An ever- present potential, 
such a fantasy can ratify all manner of enjoyment.
The documentary has also shown us all along that acting “as if” is 
tricky business, attendant with risks and its own unique forms of insight 
and transformation. Recall Freud’s comment that “the sexual instinct in its 
strength enjoys overriding this disgust” (of the other’s genitals). Disgust, 
as it is overridden becomes enjoyment, continuous with fun but extending 
critically past it. In The Look of Silence, the drinking of the victim’s blood 
keeps the full realization of one’s own acts at bay, and in The Act of Kill-
ing, Herman, dressed in elaborate drag as a communist wife, eats his vic-
tim’s liver. In its oscillation across the clean and the unclean, disgust also 
bears a relationship to the sacred itself. Ilmu is the sacred knowledge that 
enables the most disgusting actions in the name of overcoming disgust.
What can screens add to our understanding of the connections 
across enjoyment, disgust, and sacrality? The stage set is a kind of play-
ground, in the sense of Johan Huizinga, who writes, “Just as there is no 
formal difference between play and ritual, so the ‘consecrated spot’ cannot 
be formally distinguished from the play- ground. The arena, the card- table, 
the magic circle, the temple, the stage, the screen, [. . .] etc., are all in form 
and function play- grounds, i.e. forbidden spots, isolated, hedged round, hal-
lowed, within which special rules obtain” (Huizinga 1950: 10). These spaces 
of play are spaces of transformation. The elaborate yet tawdry stage sets 
recall the unadorned anonymous rooftop, a space that takes on an aura of 
consecration once we have received Anwar’s narrative about the deeds he 
committed there. Let’s recall that the original atrocities, too, were ludic in 
nature.
There is one reenactment in the film where the crucible that is the 
magical circle, the stage, the screen, is shown most stunningly in its trans-
formative aspect. This is an elaborate scene of a village being burned to the 
ground, bodies being dragged, women being raped.34 Initially, we see the 
reenactment being rehearsed, the actors being given instructions. Once 
the scene ends, we cut to an image of Anwar asleep in his bed at night, and 
slowly the sound comes in, as if this might be a dream Anwar is having, 
of people shouting in the distance. The sound remains muffled but grows 
louder as we see the following: men dragging away struggling bodies, chil-
dren being taken from mothers, a man being stripped then humiliated, 
another person being hauled by their torn shirt, a bound body being carried 
34. Though not announced in the film itself, Oppenheimer has indicated that all actors in 
the scene were volunteers, and all of them members of the families of Pemuda Pancasila.
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by men in Pemuda Pancasila outfits, men kicking someone (presum-
ably) with all their strength, dead bodies thrown here and there. All of this 
appears to us unframed, with the diegesis of the reenactment becoming 
the only diegetic world we see. Even though we have just seen this scene 
being rehearsed, it comes at us with an immediacy that becomes increas-
ingly uncomfortable the more the sound recedes. Suddenly we hear “Cut,” 
and the spell is broken. Some of the children are crying and upset after the 
filming, and Herman tries to calm them down. An elderly woman is con-
scious but unresponsive—someone holds her head and whispers an incan-
tation and blows on her head three times in hopes of reviving her. It seems 
not everyone involved in the filming can keep the trauma of the reenacted 
scenes at bay, as “mere” reenactment. These traumatized reactions hardly 
indicate incapacity to differentiate between reality and its mere image. 
Rather, these reactions hold a key to the form of being that Anwar Congo 
and the other death squad youths inhabited in the sixties. In this sequence, 
imitation leads to identification, and its result is trauma, but this need not 
always be the case—the exact same process had occurred earlier from the 
side of perpetrators, who, empowered with ilmu, imitated their favorite film 
heroes and villains, those great figures of escaping one’s own death.
If the screen is the surface upon which fantasy can be projected, it 
is not for that reason illusory. If we understand fantasy in its Lacanian defi-
nition as that which is not opposed to reality but is rather the suturing and 
compensatory mechanism that gives shape to reality as a coherent experi-
ence, then the mediating functions of the screen foreground play as a cen-
tral feature of the truths that might obtain from screens. The older woman 
and the children have misrecognized playacting for the real thing, and their 
misrecognition mirrors our own experience of watching the scene—we too 
have known it was all playacting but its cinematic strategies had us believ-
ing in it nevertheless. In this magical instance we see the screen and see 
past it, weighted as that screen form is with an event that threatens to 
recede from us. In this generative misrecognition, the past is brought into 
proximity with the present.
So we experience the horror all the while knowing it is merely a 
reenactment, and in the final scene of Anwar’s extended retching, I could 
not help but feel slightly sick to my stomach.35 This, because I mirrored 
his disgust and that, in turn, swelled the repugnance I felt at the possibility 
35. Similar to these instances, there is another reenactment where Anwar takes a blade 
to a stuffed doll that is a stand- in for his victim’s child, and seeing this toy ripped apart 
can be an unnerving experience.
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of such identification with Anwar. The affective contagion that underwrites 
disgust brings viewers into proximity with an experience that is forever lost 
elsewhere and in another time. Sometimes cinema, too, can be a conse-
crated space. By means of its cinematic strategies, The Act of Killing opens 
up a space in which the mass killings—each death nonexchangeable— 
disclose themselves as inassimilable, incapable of being metabolized. 
Where does the atrocity reside if people get away with it? It would seem 
it resides in Anwar’s bodily symptoms, but it also resides in the memo-
ries of the survivors, and, by means of the film, it resides in the specta-
tors’ reactions to the final sequence. At each of these moments of mirror-
ing, something changes, and something new is also created. The historical 
event becomes commutable as an ever- changing somatic state. The con-
tagious disgust that ensues only points to its absence in other terrorizing 
instances, and thereby disgust multiplies. It remains haunted, however, by 
the danger that there is enjoyment to be had in overriding it.
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